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Regulated Efficiency, World Trade Organization Accession, and 
the Motor Vehicle Sector in China 
Joseph F. Francois and Dean Spinanger  
This paper is concerned with the interaction of regulated efficiency and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) accession and its impact on China’s motor vehicle sector. The 
analysis is conducted using a 23 sector–25 region computable general equilibrium 
model. Regulatory reform and internal restructuring are found to be critical. 
Restructuring is represented by a cost reduction following from consolidation and 
rationalization that moves costs toward global norms. Without restructuring, WTO 
accession means a surge of final imports, though imports of parts could well fall as 
production moves offshore.  However, with restructuring, the final assembly industry 
can be made competitive by world standards, with a strengthened position for the 
industry. 
JEL Classification: F13, F14, F17 
Keywords: China Accession to WTO, Automobile Sector 
 
 
 
Producing automobiles has often been a symbol of economic prestige in the 
developing world. Brazil, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and others have all promoted 
and sometimes even showcased the development of a domestic motor vehicle 
industry. In China, with its huge population and a surface area roughly as large as the 
United States and almost 15 percent larger than Brazil (table 1), almost every 
province has its own motor vehicle factory and satellite factories. But despite all the 
factories, China has the largest number of people per vehicle among major economies 
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in the world. Even Indonesia, with a 30 percent lower per capita income, has only half 
as many people per automobile. 
China’s status as a country with one of the highest number of people per 
vehicle is the outcome of a series of policy measures, dating as far back as the 
inception of the People’s Republic of China, that have distorted the structure of the 
automobile industry (table 2). Internal measures limited and even prohibited trade 
through local protectionism (analogous to former interprovincial trade restrictions in 
Canada). The government has also set prices and limited competition through a 
barrage of import restrictions, which have included quotas, high tariffs, and 
differential taxes favoring local suppliers. The restrictions on trade have encouraged 
inefficient production and allowed for market segmentation. 
China’s integration into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and thus into 
most favored nation principles, has important implications for its economy, especially 
the motor vehicle sector. Accession agreements define major changes in tariffs, 
quotas and local content requirements, and rules on foreign investment. There has 
already been a change in market perceptions by outside investors, as the application of 
WTO rules on treatment of foreign firms has reduced uncertainty about the general 
economic climate, inducing notable increases in investment and prompting new 
decisions about entering the market.  
This article is concerned with the impact of these broad changes on the 
Chinese motor vehicle sector. It emphasizes the role of administratively imposed 
inefficiencies (“regulated efficiency”) within the sector and the role of such regulated 
efficiency in structural adjustment. The industry itself anticipates significant change. 
In recent years the sector has grown rapidly, with output expanding at an annualized 
rate of 13 percent in the four years ending in 1999, at a rate of 26 percent in the three 
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years to 2002, and at more than double that in 2003. With modern plants having come 
on line in 2001 and 2002, and additional facilities expected to increase capacity by 
more than 150 percent from 2002 to 2005, a large, discrete change in production 
levels is expected. 
At the same time, WTO membership implies lower prices and steeper foreign 
competition in the sector. Response to this shift in the competitive landscape will be 
shaped by continuing problems with local government protection, lack of automobile 
infrastructure (roads, parking, service facilities), and related factors that act as 
constraints on growth of the sector. Even so, the industry itself expects continued 
strong growth. 1 
Notwithstanding industry expectations, what can realistically be expected once 
the competitive landscape has changed in critical ways? This question is explored 
here using a computable general equilibrium model.  
 
I. THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY IN CHINA  
National and regional policies in China have resulted in a highly fragmented and 
inefficient motor vehicle industry by global standards. This was not only the result of 
                                                 
1 See, for example, China Online (2000). As WTO membership approached, the opinions of the 
industry and related ministries, as reflected in the Chinese press, hinged critically on whether 
restructuring of the domestic industry would be allowed to proceed. Thus a report in Touzi Yu Hezuo 
(summarized in China Online 2000)  stressed expected injury to the industry, while the industry itself 
was expressing optimism that it could realize significant cost reductions and remain competitive with 
imports (Feenstra and others 2001). In the meantime, price cuts by foreign producers in China are 
becoming commonplace, some of them induced by increased import competition and others by more 
intense domestic competition. Buick, for instance, reduced prices on its domestically produced models 
by 12 percent, while Volkswagen lowered Passat prices by 6.5 percent (indiacar.net, May 3, 2002). 
Even more important, nearly all major foreign producers have announced plans to establish or sizably 
increase production capacities. A recent major manufacturer to do so was DaimlerChyrsler in 
September 2003, finally ratifying plans to establish facilities to produce C and E models in China 
(International Herald Tribune, September 9, 2003). 
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the introduction of Soviet-style industrialization beginning in the 1950s, with firms 
viewed merely as production units producing according to plan, making questions 
about efficiency irrelevant.2 It was also the result of import substitution policies and 
cooperation agreements with foreign companies beginning in the 1980s that were 
meant to fill the increasing gap between supply and rapidly expanding demand for 
automobiles. The major thrust of policies was to build trucks, not passenger cars 
(figure 1).  
Motor vehicle companies are thus operating with cost structures that are well 
within the global frontier, with plants that are producing considerably below global 
standards for efficient scale (table 3). For plants producing a single model, minimum 
efficient scale for final assembly of cars has been estimated at more than 200,000 
units per plant per year (Huang 2002, p. 543). China’s entire sedan production in 1998 
was 507,000 vehicles produced in 13 factories. Of these, only one factory produced 
more than 200,000 sedans. 
Several plants had production runs of fewer than 20,000 sedans.3 In 1998 
China had 122 motor vehicle manufacturing plants, 520 automobile-refitting factories, 
130 motorcycle factories, 62 car-engine factories, and 1,589 automobile and 
motorcycle spare-parts factories. Annual production capacity now exceeds 2.3 million 
motor vehicles and 10 million motorcycles. Since 1995 the general pattern has been to 
                                                 
2 As noted by Zhang and Taylor (2001, pp. 261 ff), First Automobile Works (FAW) provides ample 
evidence of the impact of various policies over the past 50 years. Between 1959 and 1981 FAW 
produced a mere 1,542 units, an average 67 units annually. In 1970 the production cost of a particular 
model (the CA72) was 220,000 yuan, but “the sales price was only 40,000 yuan…In the absence of 
competition, all production units ran at low levels of productivity and efficiency…By 1980 the number 
of automotive enterprises had risen to 2,379, consisting of 56 vehicle manufacturers...[producing] 5,418 
cars.”  
3 There are strong parallels to the situation in Mexico before the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (Lopez de Silanes, Markusen, and Rutherford 1994), where protected, inefficient factories 
operated well within the global technology frontier. 
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shut down smaller plants (generally relegated to the “other” category in table 3), and 
expand production runs in the larger plants. With foreign investment and rapid growth 
in the industry, the number of plants producing at least 25,000 vehicles rose from 3 in 
1995 to 11 in 2002. 
Import and domestic shipment data in value terms for 1997, the “pre-
accession” reference point, are summarized in table 4.  Reflecting relative tariff 
differences, imports are concentrated in parts rather than vehicles. China’s pre-
accession average tariff on automobile products (vehicles and parts) was 35 percent 
(table 5). The rate for vehicles averaged 70 percent, with sedans subject to tariffs of 
80–100 percent. Parts were subject to an average tariff of 23 percent. Import shares 
were relatively low, averaging perhaps 3 percent during 1995–2002. Officially, only 
20,000 sedans were imported, though many more were likely smuggled into the 
country. 4 Official policy encouraged the use of domestic parts and favored locally 
(regionally) produced parts. Domestic content rules applied to new investments, 
stipulating 80 percent domestic content by the third year. The effects of these policies 
are reflected in the low share of imported automotive parts imports in total 
production. Even after China’s completion of WTO accession, foreign ownership will 
be limited to 50 percent.5 
Tariff rates are scheduled to come down substantially as part of the WTO 
accession process: by 25 percent on vehicles and 10 percent on parts on a most 
favored nation basis. Quotas will be phased out by 2006 and will be reduced by 15 
                                                 
4 Unofficial estimates (based on interviews) are that 100,000 or more sedans have been imported in 
recent years. Many smuggled cars are luxury models. 
5 In the past, finding partners often meant having to go to provinces other than those on the coast. 
These provinces often tried to ensure that “buy local” conditions prevailed. In the case of taxis in 
Shanghai, regulations stipulated specifications that could be filled only by a Volkswagen model. 
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percent a year until then. Domestic content requirements have already been removed. 
(Both of these nontariff barriers violate basic WTO rules.) Other WTO obligations 
imply free movement of imported automobiles (free of import quotas) within the 
Chinese market. The internal barriers to trade simply cannot be sustained if China’s 
new WTO obligations are to be taken seriously. All these changes in the structure of 
protection imply tremendous pressure for a breakdown of internal barriers for 
domestic production and for rationalization of the domestic industry.  
The government realizes the implications for the structure of the automotive 
sector. Official and industry sources indicate an intention to support only a small 
number of domestic production groups, perhaps including the Shanghai group 
(Volkswagen), China First Auto Works (Volkswagen), Shanghai GM (Buick), and the 
Dongfeng Group (Citroën). These groups with their foreign partners already account 
for more than 70 percent of production in China. Such a sharp rationalization will 
undoubtedly be painful, but it could allow the industry to consolidate production and 
work its way down the average cost curve for vehicle production. 
 
II. THE MODELING FRAMEWORK 
A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used to assess the possible impact 
of China’s accession to the WTO. (More technical details and references for the 
model are provided in Francois and Spinanger 2001 and in the technical annex 
available for download with the model files.6) CGE models have become a standard 
                                                 
6 The model files, along with the technical annex describing the model, can be downloaded from 
www.intereconomics.com/francois. The model is implemented in GEMPACK. 
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approach for analysis of multisector policy initiatives such as the accompanying WTO 
accession (Francois 2000). While the exercises are hampered by both the necessary 
assumptions and the quality of available data, their estimates of the direct and indirect 
impact of broad policy changes have proved helpful for assessing existing economic 
policies and formulating new ones. 
The Model Data 
The data come from a number of sources. They are organized into 23 sectors and 25 
regions (table 6). Details on the value added chain linking fibers into textiles and 
clothing production are included to better capture the initial impact on the base 
scenario of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which is scheduled to 
phase out the remaining textile and clothing quotas by 2005.  
Data on production and trade are based on national accounting data linked 
through trade flows and drawn directly from the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) version 5 dataset (McDougall 2001). The dataset is benchmarked to 1997 and 
includes detailed data on national input-output, trade, and final demand structures. 
The basic database was updated to better reflect actual import protection for goods 
and services. 
Basic data on current tariff rates come from United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and WTO data on the schedules of applied and 
bound tariff rates. These are integrated into the core GTAP database. They are 
supplemented with data from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. 
International Trade Commission on regional preference schemes in the Western 
Hemisphere. Data on agricultural protection, as integrated into the GTAP core 
database, are based on estimates by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
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Development and United States Department of Agriculture. Estimates on tariffs and 
nontariff barriers are further adjusted to reflect remaining Uruguay Round 
commitments, including the phase-out of textile and clothing quotas under the ATC. 
Data on post-Uruguay Round tariffs are from recent estimates reported by Francois 
and Strut t (1999), which come primarily from the WTO's integrated database, with 
supplemental information from the World Bank's recent assessment of detailed pre- 
and post-Uruguay Round tariff schedules. All this tariff information has been matched 
to the current model sectors. Services trade barriers are based on the estimates 
described in the technical annex and are shown in table 7 (the basic GTAP database 
includes no information on trade barriers for services, for example). 
The basic GTAP dataset is benchmarked to 1997 and reflects applied tariffs in 
place in 1997. Because the interest here is with the post-Uruguay Round world, a 
“pre-experiment” was run on the model to implement the remaining Uruguay Round 
tariff cuts. Most of these cuts were already in place in the 1997 benchmark dataset. 
The data were also adjusted to reflect regional preference schemes in Latin America 
(not represented in the core GTAP database). The dataset used for actual policy 
experiments is therefore a representation of a notional world economy (with values in 
1997 dollars) with full Uruguay Round tariff cut implementation. Experiments 
consider both the ATC phase-out and China’s WTO accession, with reference to this 
post-Uruguay Round tariff benchmark. 
Model Structure 
Except for the automobile sector, the CGE model structure is standard. On the 
production side firms in all sectors minimize costs, employing domestic factors of 
production (capital, labor, and land) and intermediate inputs from domestic and 
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foreign sources to produce goods and services. Technologies are modeled as constant 
elasticity of substitution processes defined over primary inputs and Leontief processes 
defined over intermediate inputs. Products from different regions are assumed to be 
imperfect substitutes in accordance with the Armington assumption. Prices on goods 
and factors adjust until all markets are simultaneously in (general) equilibrium—all 
markets clear. While changes are modeled in gross trade flows, changes in net 
international capital flows are not (this does not preclude changes in the level of gross 
capital flows). Trade liberalization in the goods sectors involves reduction of tariffs, 
and a shift from model base rates to the new bound rates. The new bound rates are 
generally quite close to the calculations of average accession rates. Liberalization in 
the service sector is modeled as a reduction in trading costs, reflecting the barrier 
reductions in barriers reported in table 7. These are Samuelson iceberg costs. 
To reflect the status quo in the motor vehicle sector in a stylized, though 
representative way, one option was to implement imperfect competition in the model. 
This was rejected, however, because it does not adequately reflect the primary issue at 
hand. Government policy has certainly resulted in market segmentation, but there is 
also price setting and regulation. The choice was made to focus on realized cost 
efficiency for the sector. The cost structure of the industry reflects the net effect of a 
basket of policies. Like clothing in India or automobiles in Mexico before the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, the structure of the automobile sector in China 
reflects regulated efficiency—the impact of the general regulatory and administrative 
environment. The critical issue is thus these collective inefficiencies, which follow 
from the full set of industrial policies. At the same time, an implication of intended 
public policy seems to be restructuring and consolidation, leading to an improvement 
in regulated efficiency. 
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What shape will the gains from changes in regulated efficiency take? Through 
rationalization, the industry may collectively move down relevant cost curves.  While 
minimum efficient scale for some models is approximately 200,000 units (Huang, 
2002), comparison with plant sizes in North America and Europe implies a global 
norm per plant closer to 350,000 units.  Further comparison of current plant scale in 
China (see table 3) with such a  norm implies that average costs are roughly 20 
percent higher simply because of inefficient scale.7 Data from interviews with 
industry representatives (Feenstra and others 2001) point to similar cost savings, with 
expectations of even higher cost reductions in the range of 25–30 percent. A World 
Bank study (1993, p. 57) describes quite succinctly the expected gains from reaching 
minimum efficient scale (MES): “If this cost-volume relationship is applied to the 
Chinese automotive industry, the passenger car segment has a cost disadvantage of 20 
to 30 percent compared with the international producers having MES. This cost 
disadvantage could be an understatement, however, as there are already eight 
producers in the market….” 
This net cost effect is stressed here and sets the treatment of motor vehicles 
apart from that of other sectors in the model. The lower bound of these cost effect 
estimates is used. In particular, the focus is on potential cost savings in the final 
assembly of automobiles due to a higher regulated efficiency level for the industry 
                                                 
7 The 20 percent figure is based on the distribution of current plants shown in table 3. An average 
cost index for the industry can be calculated by applying the formula 
)ln() ln( QuantityCDRCostAverage DD ×= , where CDR is the inverse elasticity of scale, defined as 
CostAverage
CostinalMCostAverage
CDR
 
 arg -
-= , and is between .125 and .135 (the range of values 
found in engineering studies). If the index is 100 at 350,000 units per plant, current plant structure 
yields a cost index of roughly 120. 
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resulting from consolidation and rationalization of policy. 8 In addition, the differential 
treatment of parts and finished vehicles in the tariff schedule is also tracked. 
That large gains can be achieved by rationalizing production and reducing 
costs was clearly demonstrated in the United States at the beginning of the 20th 
century (figure 2). In 1914, “13,000 workers at Ford were producing 260,720 cars. By 
comparison, in the rest of the industry, it took 66,350 workers to make 286,770” cars.9 
Such dichotomies also exist across the spectrum of production possibilities in China 
today, with new foreign-built modern plants coexisting with Mao-era facilities. 
Similar demand factors also prevailed. As a result of Ford’s new production methods, 
cars in the United States moved from being scarce goods to goods affordable by large 
segments of the population. China is already moving into this phase. The similarity 
between China’s motor vehicle production from 1984 to 2002 and that of the United 
States between 1900 and 1924, as shown in figure 2, would seem to justify such an 
analogy.  
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
The experiments involve full accession for China and Taiwan, China. The basic 
accession package involves the changes in tariffs detailed in table 7. For automobiles 
the following effects are modeled:   
· Tariffs on motor vehicles decrease to 25 percent. 
· Tariffs on automobile parts are phased down from an average of 23.4 
percent to an average of 10 percent.  
                                                 
8 In other words, we model cost savings at the assembly level.    
9 See www.wiley.com/ products/subject/business/forbes/ford.html. 
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· The industry is rationalized. Implicitly, this involves elimination of 
internal regional barriers and consolidation within the domestic market. 
Small, inefficient factories close. To quantify this effect, sedan production 
is taken as representative. Given the typical scale of domestic production, 
automobile plants are assumed to realize a 20 percent cost savings in 
assembly if they move to efficient scale. (See footnote 2 and the discussion 
in section II). This savings is modeled at the assembly level. 
 
The overall sectoral impacts of the experiments are presented in table 8, which 
reports changes in the quantity of output under alternative scenarios. Extending the 
ATC phase-out to China and Taiwan, China, implies a dramatic expansion in the 
textile and clothing sectors, with textiles growing 14 percent and clothing 50 percent. 
There are important general equilibrium effects, as the resources needed for this 
experiment are drawn from other parts of the economy, including the motor vehicle 
sector. 
Especially important for the motor vehicle sector are the results reflecting the 
incremental impact of China’s market access commitments made as part of WTO 
accession and shown in columns B and C of table 8. Column B is a business as usual 
scenario, without restructuring. It reflects a domestic motor vehicle industry that 
continues to be fragmented, with favored producers in each region, small production 
runs, and high costs. Such an industry is simply unable to compete with imports. It is 
hit very hard by imports, with domestic production falling 37 percent. Combined with 
the initial impact of the ATC phase-out, there is a dramatic retrenchment of the 
uncompetitive domestic industry in the face of imports (column D). 
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By contrast, the scenario with elimination of internal barriers, rationalization 
of plants (with smaller plants being closed), and an efficiency ga in of roughly 20 
percent as scale economies are realized, production rises slightly (3 percent) and the 
industry emerges as a relatively competitive one, despite the loss of protection 
(columns C and E). 
The most striking difference between the two scenarios is in the impacts on 
intermediate parts production and final automobile production (table 9). Under the 
scenario of business as usual, imports of parts rise slightly, while their share of the 
domestic market rises substantially. There is a dramatic surge in imports of motor 
vehicles, which displace more than a third of domestic production. There is a drop in 
the overall market for parts because of the decline in domestic vehicle production. 
Under the second scenario of rationalization of the final assembly sector, which 
allows the sector to compete more directly with imports, there is a shift to imported 
intermediates (rising to a market share of more than 50 percent), a fall in domestic 
parts production (displaced by imports), and steady overall demand for parts. While 
ground is lost to parts imports, sales of domestic vehicles remain steady in the face of 
imports. 
China’s WTO accession also affects value added and trade. It is logical to 
expect some export response, both because of the general liberalization in trade and 
because pressure from imports may force firms to seek other markets. China exports 
less that 4 percent ($1.3 billion of production of $32 billion) of its production in the 
sector based on 1997 values. To put this in perspective, Australia has a comparable 
level of exports with an industry only one-third the size of China’s. The Republic of 
Korea’s export share is 10 times as large. China’s trade is therefore well below global 
integration standards, measured by exports.  
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The model experiments show that restructuring accelerates the export 
orientation of the automobile industry, with a rapid growth in exports (table 10). 
Exports rise by roughly $3.8 billion, or 300 percent, reaching roughly 10 percent of 
production by value. While this seems dramatic, it needs to be kept in perspective. 
Automobiles and parts are a small share of exports (0.6 percent in 1997) and remain 
small (up to 2 percent) even with the growth in automobile exports. Most of the 
restructuring remains focused on the domestic market.  
 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Regulatory reform and internal restructuring are critical to the impact of WTO 
accession on China’s motor vehicle sector. Such restructuring is represented here by a 
cost reduction following from consolidation and rationalization. This representation is 
supported by a comparison of scale in a typical automobile plant in China to that in 
typical plants in North America or Europe, and also by firm survey responses. It is 
also supported by earlier estimates of the benefits from achieving minimum and 
efficient scale and radical restructuring to improve production efficiency. The net 
result is a movement of costs toward global norms. With restructuring, the final 
assembly industry can become competitive by world standards, while the parts 
industry further integrates with the global industry through exports (and through 
higher imports). Without such restructuring, however, the domestic industry remains 
uncompetitive, and WTO accession means that imports of final vehicles will surge, 
though imports of parts will fall as production moves offshore. 
Viewed in total, what do the results show? They highlight the importance of 
incorporating the impact of regulatory regimes on costs when assessing the impact of 
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changes in trade policy. For China, restructuring within the domestic market results in 
a qualitatively different impact from tariff reductions. Without such restructuring, the 
industry fails to compete and contracts dramatically. However, with restructuring, the 
final assembly industry can be made internationally competitive. In addition, the 
industry shifts to local assembly, with high import content for domestic vehicles.   
Two additional issues need to be raised. The first concerns China’s population 
to motor vehicles ratio, which is far higher than that in many other countries with 
similar income levels (see table 1). Since this reflects the impact of existing policies, a 
significant change in policies could shift demand closer to a normal pattern of 
consumption, given China’s geographic attributes. The second issue concerns further 
strengthening of demand for cars through better access to financing. Roughly 75 
percent of U.S. and European automobile purchases are financed through loans, but 
only 15 percent of automobile purchases in China are financed this way. While 
China’s protocol of accession to the WTO stipulates that automobile finance will be 
liberalized, only draft legislation has been presented to date.10 To the extent that this 
potential demand can be tapped, the pressure on firms to be more productive and thus 
more competitive will be all the greater. This would be another factor helping to 
ensure that the calculated welfare gains will come about. 
The shortcomings of the analysis also need to be highlighted. The model 
applied here is very stylized, although it widely captures the real world. While 
restructuring has positive overall implications for the industry, there are bound to be 
adjustment costs that are not pointed to in the model. Even if value added is preserved 
                                                 
10 Nonetheless, some major car companies (Volkswagen and Ford) did reach agreements with 
Chinese banks earlier this year (KPMG 2003, p. 7). According to the International Herald Tribune 
(October 6, 2003) China has opened up this sector in line with its WTO commitments.  
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within the sector, there will likely be a dramatic relocation of jobs toward a limited 
number of plants, with job losses in the other, smaller plants. The current regional 
scattering of final automobile production (table 11) will be repla ced by a more 
geographically concentrated pattern. Parts production will also tend to concentrate. To 
the extent that parts suppliers are able to supply regional markets, this is likely to 
mean that existing clustering in coastal regions will intensify, with parts shipments to 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and other regional centers of 
production. 11 From an employment perspective, output and value added results 
closely track the impact on employment. The results point to a range of effects on 
employment, from –40 percent without restructuring to –3 percent with restructuring. 
This range of effects highlights the importance of rationalizing the structure of plants.  
                                                 
11 European manufacturers have already established 12 plants in China, and one large U.S. company 
(Delphi) is shifting from Mexico. 
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TABLE 1. GNP, Population, and  Stocks of Automobiles in China  and Selected Countries,
2000
Vehicle stock, 2001
(millions)
Economy
GNP per
capita (2002
PPP $)a
Population,
2001
(millions) Automobiles Trucks
People per
automobile
Surface area
(1,000 sq.
km)
Low and middle income 4,682 3,274.4 140.6 54.9 23.3 49,263
India 2,570 1,032.4 6.3 5.9 163.2 3,287
Indonesia 2,990 209.0 3.0 2.4 68.8 1,905
China 4,390 1,271.8 8.5 15.4 149.0 9,598
Colombia 5,870 43.0 1.8 0.8 23.4 1,139
Turkey 6,120 66.2 4.5 1.6 14.6 775
Thailand 6,680 61.2 2.9 4.1 21.4 513
Brazil 7,250 172.4 15.8 4.0 10.9 8,547
Russia 7,820 144.8 21.2 5.1 6.8 17,075
Malaysia 8,280 23.8 4.2 1.0 5.6 330
Mexico 8,540 99.4 12.2 5.6 8.2 1,958
South Africa 9,870 43.2 41.0 2.5 1.1 1,221
Argentina 9,930 37.5 5.4 1.6 7.0 2,780
High income 29,248 742.7 351.6 129.4 2.1 21,937
Korea, Rep. of 16,480 47.3 8.9 4.0 5.3 99
Taiwan, China 17,730 22.4 4.8 0.9 4.6 36
Spain 20,460 41.1 18.2 4.2 2.3 506
Italy 25,320 57.9 33.2 3.8 1.7 301
United Kingdom 25,870 58.8 27.8 3.4 2.1 243
Japan 26,070 127.0 53.5 19.9 2.4 378
France 26,180 59.2 28.7 5.9 2.1 552
Germany 26,220 82.3 44.4 3.6 1.9 357
Canada 28,070 31.1 17.1 0.7 1.8 9,971
United States 35,060 285.3 128.7 88.0 2.2 9,629
a. PPP is purchasing power parity.
Source: World Bank, various years, World Development Indicators; Verband der Automobilindustrie,
various issues.
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Period Characteristics 
1953–65: Self-reliance policy  
 • Roughly 60,000 vehicles produced per year. 
 • Relied on Soviet technologies. 
 • No other international contacts. 
 • Provincial governments set up production units. 
 • By 1960, 16 auto producers and 28 assembly     
companies. 
  
1966–80: Security oriented  
 • Government invested heavily in western regions 
(Sichuan, Shanxi, and Hubei). 
 • Remote locations caused severe problems and 
overcapacity. 
 • Focus on heavy military vehicles.  
 • Car demand increased rapidly and capacities expanded 
to 160,000 units a year. 
 • By 1980, 58 carmakers, 192 assembly companies, and 
2,000 spare parts producers. 
  
1981–98: Initial fruits of 
open-door policy 
 
 • Open-door policy in 1978 kick-started industry. 
 • VW already started in 1978. 
 • Number of companies almost doubled during 83–85, 
from 65 to 114 units. 
 • By 1998, roughly 2,500 production units. 
 • Provincial governments further regionalized production. 
 • Major international firms begin to invest and then stop 
rapidly. 
 • Joint ventures accounted for about 60 percent of 
production. 
  
1999–present: opening up 
and beyond 
 
 • Major investments by foreign companies. 
 • All major Japanese and German companies in China. 
 • French, Italian, and U.S. producers nominally present. 
 • Rapid expansion; capacity now near 2.5 million units. 
 • Growing capacity in costal areas. 
 
TABLE 2. Summary of Developments in the Chinese Automotive Sector  
 
Source: Summary produced by authors from various sources. 
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TABLE 3. Number of Passenger Cars Produced by Plants in China, 1995–2002 
Rank 
2002/1995 Plant 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002a 
 1/1 Shanghai-Volkswagen 160,070 200,222 230,443 235,000 230,946 221,524 230,378 248,000 
 2/4 FAW-Volkswagen 24,553 44,825 46,405 66,000 81,464 94,147 101,622 131,000 
 3/na Shanghai-General Motors — — — — — 30,024 58,548 106,000 
 4/2 Tianjin Xiali (Daihatsu) 65,258 88,232 95,155 100,021 101,828 81,951 41,703 93,000 
 5/5 FAW-Audi-Hongqi 19,350   15,000 15,731 31,225 52,667 78,000 
 6/9 Shenlong (Citroën) 3,797 9,228 30,035 36,240 40,200 53,900 52,850 68,000 
 7/6 Chang'an (Suzuki) 17,770 16,420 35,160 36,239 44,583 48,235 50,573 64,000 
 8/na Guangzhou-Honda — — — 2,246 10,008 32,228 51,153 60,000 
 9/na Shanghai-Qirui — — — — — 2,767 30,085 47,000 
 10/na Geely Group — — — — — 14,594 21,702 38,000 
 11/na Dongfeng Fengshen — — — — — 3,159 8,000 32,000 
 12/na Haima (Nainan-Mazda) — — — — — 3,059 7,800 20,000 
 13/na Yuedo-Kia — — — — — 2,423 6,210 16,000 
 14/na Qinchuan — — — — — 5,380 5,686 16,000 
 15/na Nanya — — — — — 1,000 8,000 13,500 
 16/3  Beijing (Jeep) 25,127 26,051 19,377 8,344 9,294 4,867 4,663 4,400 
 17/7  Guizhou Yunque (Subaru) 7,105 798 1,000 — — 859 1,253 2,100 
 18/na Tianjin-Toyota — — — — — — — 2,000 
 na/8 Guangzhou-Peugeot 6,698 2,416 1,557 — — — — — 
 Other 22,570 — 22,479 8,013 31,312 17,930 — 1,900 
 Total 352,298 388,192 481,611 507,103 565,366 649,272 732,883 1,040,900 
          
 Number of plants producing 
> 25,000 cars 
3 4 5 5 5 8 9 11 
 Number of plants producing 
> 50,000 cars 
2 2 2 3 3 4 7 8 
 Number of plants producing 
> 100,000 cars 
1 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 
 
na is not applicable. 
— is not available or plant did not exist. 
a. Values are based on company projections. 
Source: Bessum 2002; Chinese Motor Vehicle Documentation Center 2002. 
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TABLE 4. China’s Motor Vehicle Industry before  
World Trade Organization Accession, 1997 (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Sector Amount 
Imported motor vehicles and parts, world prices 3,607.7 
Imported motor vehicles and parts, internal prices 4,849.3 
   Imported parts 3,239.5 
   Imported motor vehicles 1,609.9 
Domestic motor vehicles, intermediates, and parts 32,812.5 
   Intermediates and parts 10,896.2 
   Industry consumption of motor vehicles 21,625.5 
   Final consumption of motor vehicles 290.8 
  
Source: McDougall 2001.  
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TABLE 5. Tariffs on Motor Vehicles in China (percent) 
Item 1997 rate Final rate 
Finished motor vehicles 71 25 
Motor vehicle parts 23 10 
    Electronic parts 12 10 
Average motor vehicles and parts 35 15 
 
Source: China WTO accession schedule, GTAP data, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 
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TABLE 6. The Reg iona l and Sectoral Breakdown  of the CGE Model
Region Sector
Primary
Hong Kong, China Wool
PeopleÕs Republic of China Natural fibers
Taiwan, China Primary food production
Japan Other primary production
Korea, Rep. of Sugar
ASEAN5a Processed food, tobacco, and beverages
Vietnam Manufacturing
India Textiles
Bangl adesh Wearing apparel
 Other South Asian economiesb Leather products
Australia Chemicals,  refinery products, rubber, plastics
New Zealand Steel refinery products
Canada Nonferrous metal products
United States Motor vehicles and parts
Mexico Electronic machinery and equipment
Brazil Other machinery and equipment
M ERCOSURc Other manufactured goods
Caribbean Basin Initiative economiesd Services
Andean Trade Pact economiesd Wholesale and retail trade services
Chiled Transportation services (land, water, air)
Other Latin Americad Communications services
European Union, 15 economies Construction
Turkey Finance, insurance, and real estate services
Africa and the Middle East Other commercial services
Rest of world Other services
a. Indonesia,  Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
b. Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
c. Includes Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Brazil is represented separately.
d. Not treated in tables and diagrams.
Source: Database aggregation produced by authors.
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TABLE 7. China's Tariff Rates before and after World Trade Organization Accession, 
as Modeled (percent) 
Sector Model base rates Accession rates New bound rates 
Merchandise    
Wool 14.8 42.0 38.0 
Natural fibers  3.1 17.4 13.6 
Primary food production 58.8 58.1 46.8 
Other primary production 0.5 6.9 5.0 
Sugar 29.5 30.0 20.0 
Processed food, tobacco, and beverages 37.7 40.7 23.2 
Textiles 25.1 25.4 10.2 
Wearing apparel 31.8 32.8 16.1 
Leather products 12.1 20.9 17.0 
Chemicals, refinery products, rubber, plastics  12.6 14.9 7.2 
Steel refinery products  9.7 8.9 5.1 
Nonferrous metal products 7.8 8.2 5.5 
Motor vehicles and parts 34.4 38.7 15.4 
   Motor vehicles  70.5 70.5 25.0 
   Parts 23.4 23.4 10.0 
Electronic machinery and equipment 11.9 16.9 9.6 
Other machinery and equipment 12.8 15.4 10.1 
Other manufactured goods 14.5 22.0 16.3 
Services    
Wholesale and retail trade services 0.0 na 0.0 
Transportation services (land, water, air) 4.0 na 2.0 
Communications services 9.2 na 4.6 
Construction 13.7 na 6.8 
Finance, insurance, and real estate services 8.1 na 4.0 
Other commercial services 48.0 na 24.0 
Other services 25.7 na 13.0 
    
na is not applicable    
Note:  Service barriers are based on gravity equation estimates. Accession rates reflect an assumed 50 percent 
drop in cross-border trading costs.    
Source: China WTO accession schedule, GTAP data, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Gravity 
estimates are based on trade and macroeconomic data and cross-country regressions; see Francois and Spinanger 
2001. 
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TABLE 8. Impact on Output of World Trade Organization Accession by China and Taiwan, 
China (percentage change) 
 A B C D=A+B E=A+C 
Sector 
Elimination of 
textile and 
apparel quotas 
Accession 
without 
automobile 
sector 
restructuring 
Accession with 
automobile 
sector 
restructuring 
Total impact 
without 
automobile 
sector 
restructuring 
Total impact 
with automobile 
sector 
restructuring 
Wool 12.8 18.3 16.8 33.4 31.8 
Other natural fibers 12.1 17.9 16.4 32.1 30.5 
Primary food –0.4 –1.0 –0.9 –1.5 –1.3 
Other primary production –2.6 –3.6 –3.3 –6.1 –5.8 
Sugar –2.3 –7.9 –8.5 –10.0 –10.6 
Processed foods –1.0 –4.7 –4.7 –5.6 –5.7 
Textiles 13.9 32.0 30.6 50.4 48.8 
Clothing 50.3 75.5 73.0 163.7 160.0 
Leather goods –7.2 5.4 3.5 –2.2 –3.9 
Chemicals, rubber, and refineries –2.0 –4.5 –4.3 –6.5 –6.2 
Primary steel –4.0 –9.1 –7.9 –12.8 –11.5 
Primary nonferrous metals –5.4 –9.2 –8.9 –14.2 –13.9 
Motor vehicles and parts –4.1 –36.7 8.0 –39.3 3.5 
Electronics –5.1 –3.9 –4.4 –8.8 –9.3 
Other machinery and equipment –3.8 –5.4 –4.8 –9.0 –8.5 
Other manufactures –2.2 –0.3 0.1 –2.5 –2.0 
Wholesale and retail trade –0.3 1.4 1.9 1.1 1.7 
Transport services –1.9 –2.0 –1.4 –3.9 –3.3 
Communications –0.5 0.1 1.0 –0.5 0.5 
Construction 0.8 2.8 4.2 3.6 5.0 
Finance, insurance, and real estate –0.7 –0.4 0.2 –1.1 –0.4 
Commercial services –0.8 –5.9 –5.4 –6.6 –6.2 
Other services 0.0 0.5 1.2 0.5 1.2 
      
Source: Model estimates; see table 7.      
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TABLE 9. Impact of World Trade Organization Accession by China and Taiwan, China, on 
China’s Motor Vehicle Market  
Item 
Benchmark 
1997 
Accession 
without 
automobile 
sector 
restructuring 
Accession with 
automobile 
sector 
restructuring 
Value (millions of 1997 U.S. dollars)    
Imported motor vehicles and parts, world prices 3,607.7 10,595.7 6,968.0 
Imported motor vehicles and parts, internal prices 4,806.4 12,080.7 7,995.7 
   Imported parts 1,609.9 2,827.9 5,535.2 
   Imported motor vehicles 3,196.5 9,252.8 2,460.5 
Domestic automobiles, intermediates, and parts 32,812.5 19,401.9 24,249.6 
   Intermediates and parts 10,896.2 4,494.0 5,189.1 
   Industry consumption of motor vehicles 21,625.5 14,698.8 18,785.0 
   Final consumption of motor vehicles 290.8 209.2 275.4 
Index and share    
Import share of total automobile parts (percent of value) 12.9 38.6 51.6 
Index of vehicle production 100.00 68.0 102.8 
Index of parts production 100.00 41.2 56.3 
 
Source: McDougall 2001 (baseline) and authors’ model estimates. (impact)  
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TABLE 10. China’s Export Shares, Baseline and Two Scenarios 
Sector Baseline 1997 
Total impact 
without automobile 
sector restructuring 
Total impact with 
automobile sector 
restructuring 
Primary 0.046 0.033 0.033 
Textiles 0.084 0.098 0.097 
Wearing apparel 0.102 0.303 0.298 
Motor vehicles and parts 0.006 0.004 0.019 
Electronic machinery and equipment 0.133 0.100 0.099 
Other machinery and equipment 0.146 0.104 0.103 
Other manufactured goods 0.397 0.294 0.290 
Services 0.087 0.062 0.062 
 
Source: McDougall 2001 (baseline) and authors’ model estimates (impact).
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TABLE 11. Location of Automobile Production in China, 2002 
 
Foreign production  Production capacity in provinces 
Producer  Foreign producer 
Capacity 
cars/year Production   Province 
Capacity 
cars/year Production  
1 SAIC VW Volkswagen 450,000 278,890  Anhui 60,000 49,397 
2 SAIC GM General Motors 100,000 111,623  Bejing 115,000 10,408 
3 FAW VW Volkswagen 270,000 158,654  Fujian 80,000 16,935 
4 FAW Toyota Toyota/Mazda 70,000 30,165  Guandong 120,000 97,921 
5 Dongfeng PSA PSA/Citroën 150,000 84,378  Guangxi Zhuang 150,000 n.a. 
6 Dongfeng Honda Honda 60,000 59,024  Guizhou 10,000 1,831 
7 Dongfeng Yulong Nissan/Yulong 60,000 38,897  Hainan 50,000 11,989 
8 Tianjing Toyota Toyota 30,000 2,147  Heilongjang 30,000 14,577 
9 JIangsu Nanya Fiat 100,000 23,393  Henan 30,000 n.a. 
10 SAIC Chery Daewoo 60,000 49,397  Hubei 180,000 84,378 
11 Zehjiang Jili Daewoo (geplant) 150,000 47,443  Jiangsu 130,000 38,460 
12 Chongqing Chang'an Suzuki Suzuki/Yanjin 150,000 67,846  Jilin 340,000 188,819 
13 Chang'an Ford Ford 50,000 na  Liaoming 230,000 3,751 
14 Dengfeng Yueda Kia Kia 50,000 20,080  Shandong 80,000           n.a. 
15 FAW Hainan Mazda 50,000 11,989  Shanghai 550,000 390,513 
16 Beijing Hyundai Hyundai 30,000 1,356  Shanxi 50,000 20,080 
17 China Guizhou Aviation Ind. Wanhong/Chenchang 10,000 1,831  Sichuan 205,000 67,846 
18 Shenyang Brilliant Junbei BMW (by mid-2003) 200,000 na  Tianjing 50,000 2,147 
19 Harbin Hafei Mitsubishi 30,000 14,577  Zehjiang 150,000 47,443 
20 Shangdong Yantei General Motors 50,000 na     
21 Southeast Zhonghua 60,000 16,935  Total 2,380,000 1,046,495 
22 Beijing Jeep Daimler-Chrysler 85,000 9,052     
23 Jinbei General Motors General Motors 30,000 3,751  Other foreign 
companies 
Number 
of 
employees 
Number 
of plants  
24 Hunan Changfeng Mitsubishi 30,000 15,067     
25 Zhengzhou Nissan Nissan 30,000 na  Bosch 3,600 6 
26 Rongcheng Huatai Hyundai 20,000 na  Kolbenschmidt 1,500 2 
27 Jiangxi Fuqi Golden Lion 20,000 na  Michelin 4,000 2 
28 Tianjing Huali Golden Lion 20,000 na  ZF/Sachs 2,100 2 
29 SAIC GM Wuling General Motors 150,000 na     
30 Sanjiang Renault Renault 30,000 na  Total 11,200 12 
31 Chengdu FAW Toyota 5,000 na     
32 Yizhong SAIC/RDS 10,000 na     
 
n.a. means actual production was not yet available  
Source: Bessum 2002; Chinese Motor Vehicle Documentation Center 2002. 
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Figure 1 
China’s production of motor vehicles, 1984-2002 (thousands) 
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source: Bessum (2002) and VDA (various issues)
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Figure 2 
Annual motor vehicle production in China and the United States, thousands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
source: Bessum (2002) and VDA, various issues.
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